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requisite to inspection of records is rejected, what rule should be
adopted? Since these records have uses which are common to every
member of the public, there is no reason to require the petitioner
to exhibit a special interest. Accordingly, the best rule is to allow
inspection by every member of the public without requiring any
interest to be shown in the records. It is true that if the rule requiring a special interest were followed-and a newspaper publisher were
deemed to have this interest-the public could be kept informed by
the press on matters contained in the records. However, this would
preclude any first-hand inspection. The public would be enlightened only after the information, which is subject to the publisher's
interpretations, had been transmitted through the newspaper. Furthermore, there is no assurance that the press would even trouble to inspect the records. If unrestrained access is allowed, on the other hand,
every member of the public will be given an opportunity to personally inspect the records and still the newspaper company will have
the right to inspect the records for its news articles. The only plausible
objection against this position is that an undue burden may be placed
on the official in charge of the records due to excessive requests to
inspect. Since, as a general rule, only interested persons will take
the trouble and time to inspect the records, the possibilities of this
happening are highly remote.
It may appear that adherence to the proposed rule will make
inspection of these records an absolute right. However, as the writ
of mandamus is not issued as a matter of right but is granted in
the sound discretion of the court, 15 the court will still retain the
means of regulating this right to inspect public records. The net
effect, nevertheless, is that since the requirement of a legal or special
interest will not have to be satisfied, more petitioners will be given
the right to inspect these records for reasons beneficial to them.
Frank N. King, Jr.

STATUTORY INTERPETATIoN-STATE WELFAR

cLAvEs-Through cession'
land lying totally within
County, Colorado for use
state granted the federal

PRoGRAM-FEDERAL EN-

and purchases2 the United States acquired
the geographical boundaries of Arapahoe
as a military installation (Fort Logan). The
government "exclusive jurisdiction" but re-

15 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Steele, 241 Ky. 848, 45 S.W.2d 469
(1932); Daniel v. Warren County Court, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 496 (1809).

1 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 142-1-22 (1953) (originally enacted in 1887).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 142-1-24 (1953) (originally enacted in 1909).
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tained the right to serve civil and criminal process within the area. 3
Forty-six years after federal acquisition a civilian resident of the Fort,
Hester Donoho, applied to the County Welfare Board of Arapahoe
County for relief under Colorado's "Aid to the Needy Disabled"
statute.4 The board denied the claim on the ground that Mrs. Donoho
did not reside in the county. After conducting a hearing, the State
Board of Public Welfare ordered the County Board to accept the application. The County Board protested, without success, to the district
court. On appeal, Affirmed. Article 1, section 8, clause 175 of the
federal constitution does not preclude a state from conferring benefits
upon inhabitants of federal military reservations. Furthermore, the
county is not "precluded by the laws of Colorado from paying benefits to the applicant." Board of County Commr'rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d
267 (Colo. 1960).
The Federal Issue
The Colorado court, after commenting that "these are questions
of first impression in Colorado and elsewhere,"6 dealt at great length
with clause 17. Although this comment is primarily directed toward
the question of state statutory interpretation, a brief discussion of
clause 17 is necessitated by the fact that the court, after considering the relevance of the clause, decided the local issue "in the light
7
of all the foregoing. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Clause 17 empowers Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation
in all cases whatsoever ... over all places purchased by the consent
of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the
erection of forts. . . ." This also applies to areas ceded to the United
States.8 Clause 17 has been applied strictly9 except in three situations: (1) where the state law in force at the time of federal acquisition must continue in order to fill the legal vacuum that would
otherwise exist; 10 (2) where Congress has re-vested certain powers
2
in the state;" and (3) where the cession is limited by its own terms.'
The decision of the Colorado court suggests a fourth exception;
3 This reservation is found almost universally in statutes consenting to fedof property within a state. Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 AtI.
eral
729 acquisition
(1926).
4

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 119-1-1 through 119-54
(1953).
56 Hereinafter referred to as clause 17.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 270 (Colo. 1960).
7Id. at 274.
8 See Annot., 74 L. Ed. 761, 766 (1929).
0
Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U.S. 285
(1943).
10 Ibid., James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
2Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1956).
12 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937).
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where a state confers a benefit on an inhabitant of a federal area.' 3
Its reasoning is not convincing. It would seem that its conclusion
that clause 17 was intended to protect federal areas from regulatory
action only1 4 is rebutted by a quotation from Madison found within
the opinion: "Nor would it be proper, for the places . . . to be in
any degree dependent on a particular [state]. . . ."15 The court's
reliance on a federal statute 16 prohibiting states from making citizenship a prerequisite to the payment of welfare benefits' 7 evidences
a failure to recognize any distinction between citizenship and residence.' 8 Its inference of constitutionality from the fact that the legislatures of other states have opened their divorce courts' 9 and granted
suffrage rights20 to residents of federal enclaves suggests that it
would allow legislators to be the sole judges of constitutionality.
Furthermore, the court seems to treat a2 dissenting opinion from the
Supreme Court as compelling authority. '
The Local Issue
As intimated previously, the Colorado court relied on the foregoing reasoning to sustain its result not only in regard to the constitutional issue, but in regard also to the non-federal question.
Except for the showing of a legislative tendency to confer certain
rights on residents of federal enclaves, there is nothing in the discussion of clause 17 that would indicate an intent on the part of the
Colorado legislature to benefit the inhabitants of Fort Logan. While
this "legislative tendency" may reflect the policy of a few states to
benefit residents of military reservations, that policy has always
been effectuated by a specific provision.2 2 It would seem that if
13 But cf. Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580, 582 (1841); McMahon v. Polk, 10 S.D. 296, 73 N.W. 77 (1897) (benefits of schooling and right
to vote).
14 Board of County Comm'rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960).
'5

Ibid.

64 Stat. 555 (1950), as amended, 67 Stat. 631 (1953), as amended, 70
Stat. 850 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 1352 (b)(2) (1958).
i' Board of County Commrs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 273 (Colo. 1960).
18 Cf. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 (1920); Jeffcott v.
Donovan, 135 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1943). The Colorado court would have
stood on firmer ground had it cited 64 Stat. 555 (1950), as amended 67 Stat.
631 (1953), as amended, 70 Stat. 850 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 1352 (b)(1) (1958),
which does set up certain residence requirements, but it would still have to face
the problem of defining residence in these circumstances.
19 Ga. Const. art. 6, § XIV, 1 (1945); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. ch. 60, § 1502
(1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.035 (1960); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 16,
§23 2(1957).
0 Board of County Comm'rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d. 267, 273 (Col. 1960).
21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U.S. 285, 296 (1943).
22 See statutes cited note 19 supra.
16
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Colorado were disposed to adopt a similar policy, it too would have
said so specifically.

The controlling statute23 in the Donoho case provides that the
"county department of public welfare shall be charged with the administration of all forms of public assistance in the county. ..
(Emphasis added. )24 Although the statute makes no provision for
federal enclaves, the court held that Fort Logan was "in the county"
and that Mrs. Donoho was a resident of the county for purposes of
the statute. Its statement of the issue may have influenced its ultimate result: "whether the County of Arapahoe is precluded by the
laws of Colorado from paying benefits to the applicant." (Emphasis
added.) 25 The question is leading and misleading, for it assumes
that an administrative agency26 has inherent powers when in fact
it may exercise only those powers delegated to it.2 7 It would seem
that "whether the county is empowered to pay benefits" would be
more nearly accurate than "whether it is precluded from paying
benefits." It should be noted that the issue involves statutory in28
terpretation exclusively.
"The term 'county' may have different meanings according to the
relation in which it is used."29 The Colorado statute could have been
intended either to encompass the entire land area originally designated as the county, or to include only that part of this area which
is not under federal control. It is arguable that Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
section 34-1-4, which sets out certain physical boundaries to be

established "as a county" (Arapahoe), indicates the Colorado legislature-to be consistent throughout its statutes-must have intended
to adopt the "total land area" approach. 30 On the other hand, it could
be argued that an enactment establishing counties is sui generis, and
is not readily comparable to any other statutory provision. Further23

Kentucky has a similar provision: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 205.200 (1960).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119-1-13 (1953).
Board of County Comm'rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 273 (Colo. 1960).
2
0 The County Commissioners were here acting as an administrative agency,
the County Welfare Board.
27 Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Board of Prison Comm'rs, 161 Ky. 135, 142, 170
S.W. 941, 943 (1914); Vermejo Club v. French, 43 N.M. 45, -, 85 P.2d 90,
93 (1938); Railroad Commn v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 124 S.W.2d 413
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
2 It appears that the Colorado court confused this issue with the constitutional issue.
29 Greb. v. King County, 60 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. 1936).
30 Cf. Howard v. Comm'rs of the Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 626-627
(1953), in which the Supreme Court allowed city annexation of a federal area.
The case lends little aid in resolving the problem of interpretation here, for the
intent of the city was not in issue. Furthermore, taxation was envolved, and it
would seem that the intent to tax wherever possible could be more readily inferred than the intent to pay out money.
24

25
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more, consistency with this enactment (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. section
34-1-4(1953) has been abandoned in other statutes of the state. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. section 62-1-1 (1953), for example, is designed to introduce fish and wildlife regulations "within this state," and, necessarily, within the counties of the state, but if this statute were construed to include federal enclaves, it would be to that extent unenforceable. 3 '
Undoubtedly there are instances in which the legislative use of
the word "county", without more, clearly was meant to designate
both federal and state lands. A state statute enacted in answer to a
congressional grant of regulatory power over federal lands would
probably fall within this category. Correct interpretation depends
upon an understanding of the circumstances under which a given
statute was passed and upon the context in which the word "county"
was used.

It has been held that the word "counties" used in a home rule
statute was not intended to include the towns within these counties. 32
33
It would seem that, absent some express provision to the contrary,
a federal enclave would no more likely be considered part of a county
than would be a town, which shares with the county the distinction
of being a creature of the state.34 Similarly, statutes requiring residence have been held to preclude civilian inhabitants of federal
enclaves from utilizing state courts for divorce proceedings. 34 However, the great bulk of the case law in this area is not helpful in the
present case because of the courts' failure to delineate and separate
the statutory and constitutional issues.
It seems unreasonable to impute to the Colorado legislature an
intent to reach into the pockets of its constituents in order to fill
the pockets of individuals whose property it may not tax, and whose
welfare does not contribute to nor detract from the general welfare of the state. The welfare payments are supported by a property
tax,3 5 and hence Mrs. Donoho is getting a "free ride." As a matter
of general policy it could be argued that the state is in a better

position to determine the necessities of such persons as Mrs. Donoho,
because of its knowledge of local conditions. On the other hand, it
31
32

Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
Robinson v. Broome County, 276 App. Div. 69, 93 N.Y. Supp. 662 (1940).
contra, State ex rel. Ranz v. City of Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477, 45 N.E. 2d

767 (1942).
33

See statutes cited note 19 supra.

34 State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great Falls, 110

Mont. 318, -, 100 P.2d 915, 920 (1940).
35 Chaney v. Chaney, 58 N.M. 66, -, 201 P.2d 782, 784 (1949); Lowe
v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, -, 133 Ad. 721, 733 (1926).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119-3-6 (1953).
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could be argued that conditions in a federal enclave, particularly a
military post, are completely foreign to civil authorities, and should
be the responsibility of the federal government. Since a state statute
is being interpreted, general policy considerations must fall to state
policies. Certainly one policy of a state is to conserve its funds-to
use them only when the interests of its taxpayers can be served. The
decision of the Colorado court is contrary to this policy.
CONCLUSION

In view of (1) the number of cases in which residents of ceded
areas have been denied rights common to residents of the state in

which the area is located, on both federal and non-federal grounds,
(2) the adoption of specific provisions to effectuate a contrary policy
found necessary in other states, (3) the absence of an avowed state
policy which would be served by a strict geographical definition
of the words "in the county," and (4) the unreasonableness of imputing an intent to the Colorado legislature to spend state money
for persons not otherwise subject to its laws, it is submitted that the
Colorado court erred in its interpretation of the statute in question.
Burke B. Terrell
TORTs-INFANTs-RiGnT OF ACTION IN
EmANCIPATED INFANT AGAINST

NEGLIGENCE PEBmIITED BY UN-

His UNE WCIPATED BRoTER-Plaintiff,

a thirteen-year-old infant, was injured in a collision with another car

while riding in a car owned and operated by his seventeen-year-old
brother. An action was filed by plaintiff's next friend against the drivers of both vehicles as co-defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the
gross negligence of his brother and the ordinary negligence of the
other driver were the proximate causes of his injuries. The defendantbrother moved to dismiss on the ground that there can be no recovery
in a tort action between unemancipated infant brothers. The circuit
court continued the case against the co-defendant, but dismissed the
action against the brother. From this ruling, the plaintiff appealed.
Held: Reversed and remanded. An unemancipated infant can maintain
an action against his unemancipated infant brother to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the latter's negligence.
Midkiff v. Midkiff, 118 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960).
The defendant argued that there is a common-law immunity
barring recovery in such actions. The court answered by stating
that it could find no cases supporting the defendant's argument,
but to the contrary, that it is well settled that an infant is liable for his

